Developer
886c863260
- Use profile-scoped canonical Git clone sources with locked refreshes - Mount shared Git configuration read-only and isolate profile content - Add API and desktop/mobile actions for live Git mount refresh Quality gates: frontend build and backend py_compile passed. Skipped: backend pytest/Ruff unavailable; Docker/manual checks not approved.
31 lines
1.3 KiB
Markdown
31 lines
1.3 KiB
Markdown
# Design: Live Git Config Mount Refresh
|
|
|
|
## Canonical source
|
|
|
|
Each selected Config Profile owns canonical Git clone directories beneath:
|
|
|
|
```text
|
|
<instance-root>/config-profiles/<profile-id>/git-mounts/<identity>/repo
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
`identity` is a stable hash of normalized remote URL, requested ref, and credential scope. Sources are deliberately profile-scoped; clones are never shared across users.
|
|
|
|
## Runtime behavior
|
|
|
|
1. Resolve Git mounts and map them to canonical sources.
|
|
2. Acquire an exclusive lock for clone, fetch, ref resolution, and checkout.
|
|
3. Clone into a temporary sibling, then rename on initial creation.
|
|
4. For refresh, fetch and update the existing working tree in place.
|
|
5. Bind directory mappings read-only. Existing containers see changed directory contents without recreation.
|
|
|
|
## Boundaries
|
|
|
|
- URL/ref/source/target/mode changes, direct-file mappings, and changed glob result sets return `restart_required`.
|
|
- Refresh failure is reported without mutating a known-good checkout.
|
|
- No non-Git profile content may be copied into a Git checkout; overlapping targets are rejected or reported.
|
|
- Containers must not write to shared Git mount sources.
|
|
|
|
## Security
|
|
|
|
Host Git operations use only an authorized server-side credential source. Credentials are not part of the mounted checkout and are not exposed to containers.
|